

Message Text

PAGE 01 STATE 058117
ORIGIN NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 R

66011

DRAFTED BY:NEA:AGLASPIE

APPROVED BY:AGLASPIE

S/S-O:RCASTRODALE

-----008555 072219Z /61

R 072048Z MAR 78 ZFF4

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN

AMEMBASSY CAIRO

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

S E C R E T STATE 058117

NODIS

FOLLOWING REPEAT DAMASCUS 1295 ACTION SECSTATE MAR 06.

QUOTE: S E C R E T DAMASCUS 1295

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PERP SY US XF

SUBJ: MARCH 5 BRIEFING OF FONMIN KHADDAM ABOUT PEACE PROCESS

SUMMARY: BRIEFED KHADDAM MARCH 5 ON PEACE PROCESS, USING TALKING
POINTS AGREED ON WITH AHERTON IN AMMAN. FONMIN EXPRESSED
APPRECIATION FOR BEING KEPT INFORMED. HE ASKED ABOUT JORDANIAN
REACTION. SAID I NOT YET INFORMED BUT KNEW WE WERE NOT TRYING
TO PRESSURE HUSSEIN. HE THEN REITERATED SYRIAN POSITION THAT
SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 058117

POLITICAL EFFORTS DERIVING FROM JERUSALEM VISIT ARE NOT
SERVING CAUSE OF PEACE. USG SHOULD NOT TRY TO DEVELOP NEW
GUIDELINES BUT RATHER RETURN TO THOSE IN UN CHARTER AND EXISTING
RESOLUTIONS, MENTIONING IN PARTICULAR UNGA 3236. ASSERTED NO
OTHER PARTIES WOULD BE BOUND BY DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES
WORKED OUT BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL. WASHINGTON ALSO SHOULD
CUT OFF ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO ISRAEL UNTIL LATTER
DRASTICALLY REVISES ITS POLICIES. REPLIED IF HE LOOKING FOR
EVIDENCE OF OUR BONA FIDES IN CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS HE SHOULD
CONSIDER OUR POSITION ON SETTLEMENTS, OUR PRESENTATION TO CONGRESS
OF PROPOSED AIRCRAFT SALES TO EGYPT, ISRAEL AND SAUDI

ARABIA AS A PACKAGE AND EXTENT TO WHICH WE NOT REPEAT NOT RESPONDING TO ISRAELI F-16 REQUESTS. ACCEPTANCE BY ISRAEL OF DECLARATION WHICH WE ARE TRYING TO HELP WORK OUT WOULD IN ITSELF BE A MAJOR POSITIVE STEP FORWARD. END SUMMARY.

1. AFTER RETURNING FROM MARCH 3-4 DISCUSSIONS ABOUT PEACE PROCESS WITH ATHERTON IN AMMAN, I BRIEFED FONMIN KHADDAM EVENING MARCH 5 FOR ONE HOUR. SAID THAT ATHERTON SENT HIS GREETINGS AND THEN MADE THE FOLLOWING TALKING POINTS AS AGREED UPON WITH ATHERTON.

2. WE REGRETTED SYRIA HAD FELT IT IMPOSSIBLE TO RECEIVE ATHERTON. WE RESPECTED ITS POSITION AND HAD AVOIDED STIMULATING DISCUSSION ABOUT FUTURE SYRIAN CONTACTS WITH HIM IN OUR DEALINGS WITH THE PRESS. SAID OUR EYES REMAINED FIXED ON THE OBJECTIVE OF A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE SETTLEMENT INVOLVING ALL FRONTS. WE REGRETTED THAT OUR EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE THIS OBJECTIVE DIRECTLY THROUGH GENEVA HAD NOT WORKED OUT. ALTHOUGH THERE HAS BEEN A CHANGE IN ROUTE TOWARDS THIS OBJECTIVE, OUR GOAL REMAINS UNCHANGED. WE ARE FOCUSSED ON TRYING TO DEVELOP A DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES WHICH ESSENTIALLY
SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 058117

WOULD ADD ONE ELEMENT TO THE BASIC FRAMEWORK ON UN RESES 242-338: PROVISION OF A PALESTINIAN DIMENSION IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AND FINAL SETTLEMENT. THAT REMAINS THE MOST DIFFICULT ISSUE. WE ARE WORKING TO BRING THE ISRAELIS TO ACCEPT A MORE FORTHCOMING LANGUAGE, SUCH AS PRESIDENT CARTER'S ASWAN FORMULATION, TO PROVIDE FOR PALESTINIAN PARTICIPATION IN DETERMINING THEIR OWN FUTURE. IN THIS PROCESS, REALISTICALLY WE CANNOT IGNORE THE INTERESTS OF OTHERS IN ADDITION TO THE PALESTINIANS, I.E., JORDAN, EGYPT AND OF COURSE ISRAEL AS THE OCCUPYING POWER. BY OUR PUBLIC STRESS ON THE NEED TO DEAL WITH "THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE IN ALL ITS ASPECTS," WE ARE ACKNOWLEDGING THE NEED TO DEAL WITH PALESTINIAN REFUGEES OUTSIDE WEST BANK/GAZA. OUR HOPE IS TO SECURE A BASIC FRAMEWORK WHICH WILL ULTIMATELY BE ACCEPTED FOR NEGOTIATIONS ENCOMPASSING THE PALESTINIANS AND ALL CONFRONTATION STATES.

3. NEITHER WE NOR THE EGYPTIANS ARE TALKING ABOUT A BILATERAL SETTLEMENT. WERE THAT THE OBJECTIVE, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN MORE QUICKLY AND MORE EASILY REALIZED. BECAUSE WE AND SADAT SEE THE PROCESS AS HAVING TO INVOLVE OTHER PARTIES, OUR WORK IS MORE COMPLEX. THERE IS A MAJOR DEBATE UNDER WAY IN ISRAEL AS EVIDENCED BY BEGIN'S WILLINGNESS TO AFFIRM ISRAELI READINESS TO RETURN TO THE INTERNATIONAL BORDERS IN SINAI AND TO END MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN WEST BANK. ALTHOUGH WE CONSIDER BEGIN'S "SELF-RULE" PLAN UNSATISFACTORY, THAT PLAN IS NEVERTHELESS INDICATIVE OF THE AMOUNT OF RETHINKING UNDER

WAY IN ISRAEL.

4. CONTINUED THAT WE CONSIDER BEGIN MUST CONFRONT THE QUESTION OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM WEST BANK/GAZA, SEE THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM AS A POLITICAL ONE AND NOT JUST SEEK A WAY TO PERPETUATE CONTINUED ISRAELI OCCUPATION UNDER ANOTHER FORM. THE NEXT IMPORTANT STEP IN NARROWING DIFFERENCES WILL BE BEGIN'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON.

SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 058117

WE WILL BE DISCUSSING TWO MAJOR ISSUES WITH HIM: THAT THE PRINCIPLE OF WITHDRAWAL IN 242 APPLIES TO WEST BANK/GAZA AND THAT SOLUTION TO THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM MUST BE AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS. WE DO NOT THINK AN INDEPENDENT STATE FOR THE PALESTINIANS IS THE BEST ANSWER EITHER FOR THAT PROBLEM OR FOR THE REGION BUT WE DEFINITELY ACCEPT THE PREMISE THAT THE PALESTINIANS MUST HAVE A VOICE IN THIS PROCESS.

5. AFFIRMED THAT WE ARE NOT JUST REPEATING OLD FORMULAE TO THE ISRAELIS. WE ARE ENGAGED IN A PROCESS WHICH IS CAUSING THING TO HAPPEN. HOWEVER, A TIME BUFFER WILL BE NEEDED AND NO ONE SHOULD ANTICIPATE BEING ABLE TO MOVE DIRECTLY FROM THE PRESENT ISRAELI OCCUPATION TO A FINAL SOLUTION FOR WEST BANK/GAZA. AS A GENERAL COMMENT, SAID THAT WE DO NOT ASSUME THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES WILL SOLVE ALL PROBLEMS, BUT DO BELIEVE IT WILL GIVE A NEW BASIS ON WHICH TO BUILD. PREDICTABLY, THE DOCUMENT WILL NOT BE AS FAR REACHING AS SOME HAD HOPED FOR BUT IT WILL DEFINITELY NOT BE THE BLAND REHASH WHICH ISRAELIS WOULD PREFER. WE MAINTAIN THE DECLARATION MUST INCLUDE A DEFINITE ADVANCE IN FORMULATING PALESTINIAN RIGHTS.

6. THE OTHER SIDE OF THE QUESTION IS THE ARAB COMMITMENT TO PEACE. THE REASON WE ARE READY TO MAKE AN EFFORT FOR PEACE AND WORK FOR WHAT IS JUST FOR THE ARABS IS BASED ON OUR ASSUMPTION THAT THE RESULTS OF THIS PROCESS WILL INCLUDE ARAB RECOGNITION OF WHAT IS JUST FOR ISRAEL. CONCLUDED THAT WE ARE EN ROUTE TOWARDS A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT AND WE HOPE THAT SYRIA WILL KEEP AN OPEN MIND CONCERNING BOTH OUR EFFORTS AND THE OVERALL PROCESS.

SECRET

PAGE 05 STATE 058117

7. AFTER MAKING ABOVE TALKING POINTS, SAID I WOULD BE HAPPY TO TRY TO ANSWER ANY QUESTIONS. KHADDAM ASKED WHAT HUSSEIN'S REACTION HAD BEEN TO ATHERTON'S PRESENTATION. I EXPLAINED THAT I HAD LEFT AMMAN BEFORE ATHERTON-HUSSEIN MEETING, INDEED BEFORE HIS MEETING SCHEDULED

FOR MORNING MARCH 4 WITH SHARAF. I KNEW ATHERTON INTENDED TO GIVE HUSSEIN THE MOST REALISTIC AND SOUNDLY-BASED ASSESSMENT POSSIBLE OF WHAT WE CONSIDER ACHIEVABLE AT CURRENT STAGE OF NEGOTIATIONS AND TO SOLICIT HUSSEIN'S OWN READING. HE DID NOT INTEND TO PRESSURE THE KING.

8. KHADDAM THEN COMMENTED SYRIA REMAINED CONVINCED THAT THE ROUND OF POLITICAL ACTIVITY WHICH BEGAN WITH SADAT'S VISIT WAS NOT SERVING THE INTERESTS OF PEACE AND COULD NOT HAVE POSITIVE RESULTS. SADAT HAD ALREADY MADE TOO MANY CONCESSIONS TO THE ISRAELIS AND DISREGARDED UN RESOLUTIONS. ANY AGREEMENT BETWEEN SADAT AND THE ISRAELIS WHICH ATHERTON MIGHT HELP ARRANGE WOULD HAVE NO BINDING FORCE OVER THE PALESTINIANS, SYRIANS OR OTHER ARABS. HE COULD NOT UNDERSTAND, KHADDAM CONTINUED, WHY ATHERTON PERSISTED IN TRYING TO REACH A NEW DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES. ALL NECESSARY GUIDELINES ARE CONTAINED IN THE UN CHARTER AND VARIOUS UN RESOLUTIONS. FOR ITS PART, SYRIA WILL NOT FORESAKE EITHER THE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIANS OR SYRIA'S NATIONAL RIGHTS. NOR WILL THE ARABS GO LIGHTLY ON ANY POLITICAN WHO TRIES TO HARM EITHER PALESTINIAN RIGHTS OR THOSE OF THE ARAB STATES VIS-A-VIS THEIR OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. WASHINGTON'S BEST COURSE OF ACTION WOULD BE TO DECLARE ITS INTENTION TO RETURN TO THE "INTERNATIONAL LEGITIMACY OF THE UN CHARTER AND THE APPLICABLE RESOLUTIONS, IN PARTICULAR UNGA 3236 AND OTHERS DEALING WITH WITHDRAWAL." USG SHOULD ALSO CUT OFF ALL AID TO ISRAEL UNTIL JERUSALEM FUNDAMENTALLY RECONSIDERS ITS AGGRESSIVE AND EXPANSIONIST POLICY. IT IS A SIMPLE FACT, KHADDAM REITERATED, THAT
SECRET

PAGE 06 STATE 058117

NO ARAB PARTY IS COMPELLED TO ACCEPT EITHER BEGIN'S CONDITIONS OR SADAT'S CAPITULATORY ACTIONS. HE ADDED THAT HE NONETHELESS APPRECIATED ATHERTON'S INITIATIVE IN KEEPING SYRIA INFORMED ABOUT HIS CONTACTS "DESPITE FACT THAT SYRIA IS NOT CONCERNED WITH THOSE CONTACTS."

9. REPLIED I KNEW I DID NOT HAVE TO JUSTIFY TO FONMIN CURRENT US DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY. KHADDAM WAS AWARE THAT BEGIN WAS RE-INTERPRETING THE MEANING OF RESOLUTION 242 IN ASSERTING IT DID NOT APPLY TO THE WEST BANK. THIS WAS ONLY ONE OF SEVERAL DEVELOPMENTS MOTIVATING ATHERTON'S CURRENT EFFORTS. ON THE OTHER HAND, OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH ISRAEL IS INTIMATE AND COMPLEX, AND I WAS SURE THE FONMIN DID NOT SERIOUSLY EXPECT WASHINGTON TO ACCEPT HIS RECOMMENDATIONS TO SEVER US ECONOMIC AND MILITARY RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL. IF, HOWEVER, HE WAS LOOKING FOR SOME EVIDENCE OF OUR BONA FIDES IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS HE SHOULD TAKE NOTE FIRST OF ALL OF OUR POSITION ON SETTLEMENTS. (CITED THE WEITZMAN/SHARON SPLIT OVER THIS ISSUE, NOTING WE HAD URGED GOI TO FREEZE ALL SUCH ACTIVITY. THE STRENGTH OF OUR

ARGUMENTS HAD A LEAST HELPED BRING ABOUT A CUTBACK IN SETTLEMENT ACTIVKTY.) RE OUR ARMS SUPPLY TO ISRAEL, I TRUSTED THE MINISTER RECOGNIZED THE SIGNIFICANCE OF OUR PRESENTATION TO THE US CONGRESS, IN INSISTING THAT PROPOSED SALES TO ISRAEL, SAUID ARABLE AND EGYPT CONSTITUTED A PACKAGE. THE LINKAGE OF THESE SALES WAS UNPRECEDENTED AND HAD CAUSED CONSIDERABLE UNEASINESS IN ISRAEL. FURTHERMORE, WE HAVE CUT BACK DEEPLY THE NUMBER OF F16S ISRAEL HAS SOUGHT AND HAVE REFUSED CO-PRODUCTION RIGHTS.

10. THE FONMIN COMMENTED THAT HE RECOGNIZED WASHINGTON'S PROBLEM DATED FROM ITS AGREEMENT TO THE SECRET ANNEXES OF SINAI II WHICH HANDCUFFED US TO A POLICY OF PROVIDING
SECRET

PAGE 07 STATE 058117

ISRAEL WITH THE LATES WEAPONRY. BUT, HE MAINTAINED, IT WILL BE DIFFICULT FOR THE US TO ACHIEVE PRACTICAL RESULTS IF IT CONTINUES TO WORK OUTSIDE THE FREAMEWORK OF UN RESOLUTIONS. NO ONE ACCEPTS THAT US, EGYPT AND ISRAEL CAN DECIDE THE FATE OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE IN THE ABSENCE OF THEIR LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATIVE, THE PLO. IT IS EQUALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR WASHINGTON, CAIRO AND JERUSALEM TO DECIDE THE FATE OF OTHER ARAB TERRITORIES. I INTERJECTED THAT WE HAD NEVER ARROGATED TO OURSELVES THE RIGHT TO DECIDE THE FATE OF THE PALESTINIANS, ANY MORE THAN EGYPT WAS PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE SPECIFICS CONCERNING THE GOLAN HEIGHTS. THIS WAS NOT THE POINT OF THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES. KHADDAM COUNTERED THAT THE PRESENT DISCUSSIONS, ASSUMING THEY PRODUCE AN AGREED DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES, CAN AT BEST ONLY SERVE TO FREEZE THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI STRUGGLE. SINCE THIS COULD BE ONLY A TEMPORARY ARRANGMENT, IT WILL NOT SERVE PEACE. "THE EGYPTIAN PEOPLE WILL ADHERE TO THER NATIONAL DIGNITY AND NATIONAL OBLIGATIONS." SAID I FELT THAT KHADDAM WAS PERSISTING IN MISUNDERSTANDING OUR EFFORTS ON BEHALF OF A DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES. WE INTENDED THIS TO BE A DYNAMIC OPENING FOR FUTURE COMPREHENSIVE NEGOTIATIONS. WE ARE NOT AIMING AT LIMITING THE PARTICIPANTS; BUT THE REALITY IS THAT WE CAN ONLY WORK WITH THOSE FORCES AND THOSE LEADERS THAT ACCEPT THE NEED TO MOVE AND TO DO SO NOW.

11. FONMIN REITERATED THAT THE DECLARATION CANNOT BE BINDING ON ANY PARTY. I REPLIED THAT IF ISRAEL ACCEPTS THE DECLARATION THIS IN ITSELF WILL BE A MAJOR AND POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT. KHADDAM THEN RECALLED A FAVORITE THEME OF ASSAD'S THAT THE ARAB STATES AND PALESTINIANS WILL NOT BEG FOR THEIR NATIONAL RIGHTS FROM ANYONE. I SAID WE WERE NOT TRYING TO MAKE A BEGGER OUT OF ANYONE. AS FAR AS FREEZING A RELATIONSHIP WITH ISRAEL,
SECRET

PAGE 08 STATE 058117

THIS WAS A LUXURY THAT PERPHAPS DAMASCUS COULD FOR A PERIOD ENJOY BUT WE WILL ALWAYS DEAL WITH THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT INVOLVED WHICH HAPPENED AT PRESENT TO BE BEGIN'S. KHADDAM DROPPED THE SUBJECT AT THIS POINT SAYING, "WELL, IN ANY CASE THIS IS A MATTER BETWEEN AERICA AND ISRAEL." I SAID THAT WE CONSIDERED SYRIA ONE DAY WILL BENEFIT FROM OUR EFFORTS. ADDED THAT I HOPED SYRIA'S WASHINGTON EMBASSY AND HIS STAFF IN THE MINISTRY WERE KEEPING HIM ABREST OF THE LATEST US PUBLIC OPINION SURVEYS CONCERNING MIDDLE EAST ISSUES. THERE HAD BEEN A DRAMITIC SWING IN THE POLLS FROM THOSE CONDUCTED BEFORE AND THOSE HELD AFTER THE JERUSALEM VISIT. THE DIRECTION IS CRITICAL OF ISRAEL. KHADDAM REPLIED THAT HE WAS AWARE OF POLLS BUT MADE NO SUBSTANTIVE COMMENT.

12. COMMENT: KHADDAM'S POSITIONS WERE FAMILIAR BOILER-PLATE. HIS REACTION TO PRESENTATION WAS, HOWEVER, FRIENDLY AND, BY SYRIAN STANDARDS, NON-POLEMICAL. I CONSIDER THIS EXERCISE OF STAYING IN TOUCH WELL WORTHWHILE. HE DIRECTED THE NOTETAKE TO STAY BEHIND AFTWARDS TO PREPARE A TEXT FOR IMMEDIATE DELIVERY TO ASSAD.

13. DEPARTMENT PASS AMMAN, CAIRO, JERUSALEM, JIDDA, TEL AVIV. MURPHY
UNQUOTE VANCE

SECRET

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 26 sep 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: PEACE, POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, CAT-B, DEBRIEFINGS, PEACE PLANS, NEGOTIATIONS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 07 mar 1978
Decaption Date: 20 Mar 2014
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978STATE058117
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter:
Enclosure: REPEAT OF DAMASCUS 1295
Executive Order: 11652 GDS
Errors: n/a
Expiration:
Film Number: N780003-0318
Format: TEL
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions:
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t197803126/baaafcaj.tel
Line Count: 303
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, TEXT ON MICROFILM
Message ID: ae685ebb-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ORIGIN NODS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: NODIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 6
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: NODIS
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 21 jun 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 3165844
Secure: LOCK1
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MARCH 5 BRIEFING OF FONMIN KHADDAM ABOUT PEACE PROCESS
TAGS: PEPR, SY, US, XF, (KHADDAM, ADB AL-HALIM)
To: AMMAN CAIRO MULTIPLE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/ae685ebb-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014